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Commodity prices are back, with a vengeance.
In the 1970s, macroeconomic discussions were dominated by the oil
price shocks and other rises in agricultural and mineral products that were
thought to play a big role in the stagﬂation of that decade.1 In the early
1980s, any discussion of alternative monetary regimes was not complete
without a consideration of the gold standard and proposals for other
commodity-based standards.
Yet the topic of commodity prices fell out of favor in the late 1980s and
the 1990s. Commodity prices generally declined during that period; per-
haps declining commodity prices are not considered as interesting as ris-
ing prices. Nobody seemed to notice how many of the victims of emerging
market crises in the 1990s were oil producers that were suﬀering, among
other things, from low oil prices (Mexico, Indonesia, Russia) or others
suffering from low agricultural prices (Brazil and Argentina). The favor-
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1. A small dissenting minority viewed the increases in prices of oil and other commodities
in the 1970s as the result of overly expansionary U.S. monetary policy, rather than as an 
exogenous inﬂationary supply shock (the result of the 1973 Arab oil embargo and the 1979
fall of the Shah of Iran). After all, was it just a coincidence that other commodity prices had
gone up at the same time, or in the case of agricultural products, had actually preceded the oil
shocks?able eﬀect of low commodity prices on macroeconomic performance—
helping deliver lower inﬂation in the United States in the 1990s than had
been thought possible at such high rates of growth and employment—was
occasionally remarked. But it was not usually described as a favorable
supply shock, the mirror image of the adverse supply shocks of the 1970s.
It always received far less attention than the inﬂuence of other factors,
such as the declining prices of semiconductors and other information
technology and communication equipment. Indeed, anyone who talked
about sectors where the product was as clunky and mundane as copper,
crude petroleum, and soy beans was considered behind the times. In Alan
Greenspan’s phrase, gross domestic product (GDP) had gotten “lighter.”
Agriculture and mining no longer constituted a large share of the New
Economy and did not matter much in an age dominated by ethereal digi-
tal communication, evanescent dot-coms, and externally outsourced ser-
vices.
Now oil prices and many broader indices of commodity prices are again
at or near all-time highs in nominal terms and are very high in real terms as
well. Copper, platinum, nickel, zinc, and lead, for example, all hit record
highs in 2006, in addition to crude oil. As a result, commodities are once
again hot. It turns out that mankind has to live in the physical world after
all! Still, the initial reaction in 2003 to 2004 was relaxed, on several grounds:
(1) oil was no longer a large share of the economy, it was said; (2) futures
markets showed that the “spike” in prices was expected to be only tempo-
rary; and (3) monetary policy need focus only on the core Consumer Price
Index (CPI) inﬂation rate and can safely ignore the volatile food and energy
component, unless or until it starts to get passed through into the core rate.
But by 2005 to 2006, the increase in prices had gone far enough to receive
much more serious attention. This was especially true with regard to the
perceived permanence of oil prices, largely because the futures price had
gone from implying that the rise in the spot price was mostly temporary to
implying that it is mostly permanent.
Certain lessons of the past are well-remembered, such as the dangers of
the Dutch Disease for countries undergoing a commodity export boom.
But others have been forgotten, or were never properly absorbed.
With regard to point (3), it is time to examine more carefully the claim
that if an increase in energy or agricultural prices does not appear in the
core CPI, then monetary policy can ignore it. The central argument of this
chapter is that high real commodity prices can be a signal that monetary pol-
icy is loose. Thus, they can be a useful monetary indicator (among many
others). The analysis is both theoretical and empirical. The empirical work
includes the determination of real commodity prices in the United States,
the determination of prices in other smaller countries, and the determina-
tion of inventories. We ﬁnd that real interest rates are an important deter-
292 Jeffrey A. Frankelminant of the demand for inventories and, in turn, of the prices of agricul-
tural and mineral commodities.
The current fashion in monetary policy is inﬂation targeting, by which is
standardly meant targeting the CPI.2 To be sure, the usual emphasis is on
the core inﬂation rate “excluding the volatile food and energy sector.” The
leadership of the Federal Reserve has indicated that the appropriate re-
sponse to the oil-shock component of recent inﬂation upticks is to ignore
it, that is, accommodate it. But just because agricultural and mineral prod-
uct prices are volatile does not mean that there is no useful information in
them. The prices of gold and other minerals used to be considered useful
leading indicators of inﬂationary expectations, precisely because they
moved faster than the sluggish prices of manufactured goods and services.
Nor does the volatility mean that excluding such products from the price
index that guides monetary policy is necessarily appropriate.
In the ﬁrst place, the “core CPI” is not a concept that is especially well
understood among the general population. Thus, the public will not nec-
essarily be reassured when the central bank tells them not to worry about
big increases in food and energy prices. Attempts to explain away high
numbers for headline inﬂation make it sound like the authorities are grant-
ing themselves an ad hoc self-pardon—like a “dog ate my homework”
excuse. This can undermine the public credibility of the central bank. But
credibility and transparency is the whole point of announcing an observ-
able target in the ﬁrst place. Thus, targeting the core CPI may not buy as
much credibility as targeting something more easily understood (even if
with a wider band).
The many proponents of inﬂation targeting will argue that the regime, if
properly instituted, makes clear from the beginning that it excludes volatile
commodity prices so that there is no loss in credibility. But, in the second
place, let us ask if it is appropriate for the inﬂation target to exclude com-
modity prices. They may be important, on terms of trade grounds, espe-
cially in smaller countries. Stabilizing the traded-goods sector is itself an
important goal in a world where balance of payments deﬁcits can lead to
ﬁnancial crises, in which the previously declared currency regime is often
one among many subsequent casualties. Recent oil price increases have
also illustrated the necessity to take into account terms of trade shocks that
come on the import side as well as the export side. Does there exist a price
index to serve as an intermediate target that is more easily understood by
the public than the core CPI, but also more robust with respect to terms of
trade shocks than the overall CPI? Candidates include a producer price in-
dex (PPI) and an export price index.
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2. Among many other references, see Bernanke et al (1999), Svensson (1995, 1999), and
Truman (2003).It is a tenet of international economics textbooks that a desirable prop-
erty of a currency regime is that the exchange rate be allowed to vary with
terms of trade shocks: that the currency automatically depreciates when
world prices of the import commodity go up (say, oil for the United States
or Switzerland, or wheat for Japan or Saudi Arabia) and that it automati-
cally depreciates when world prices of the export commodity go down (say,
oil for Saudi Arabia and wheat for Canada). Yet CPI targeting does not
have this property. To keep the headline inﬂation rate constant, one must
respond to a rise on world markets in the dollar price of imported oil by
tightening monetary policy and appreciating the currency against the
dollar enough to prevent the domestic price of the importable from rising.
This response is the opposite from accommodating the adverse terms of
trade shock, which would require a depreciation. It is true that the core in-
ﬂation rate does not share this unfortunate property with the headline rate
(unless the price increase comes in nonenergy commodities like semicon-
ductors that are in the core). But the other half of terms of trade shocks are
declines on world markets in the price of a country’s export commodity.
Theory says that when the dollar price of oil goes down, Saudi Arabia or
Norway ought to depreciate against the dollar. But inﬂation targeting—
eitherthe headline CPI variety orthe core CPI variety—does not allow this
result. One would need to target a price index that speciﬁcally featured
prominently the price of the exportable. The fundamental diﬃculty is that
excluding the volatile food and energy components is not suﬃcient to ac-
commodate the terms of trade, either if some imports lie outside those two
sectors or if some exports lie within those two sectors.
Throughout this chapter, we will adopt the familiar assumption that all
goods can be divided into homogeneous agricultural and mineral com-
modities, on the one hand, and diﬀerentiated manufactured goods and ser-
vices, on the other hand, and that the key distinction is that prices of the
former are perfectly ﬂexible so that their markets are always clear and that
prices of the latter are sticky in the short run so that their markets do not.3
The plan is to look at connections between commodities and monetary
policy. We begin with the monetary inﬂuences on commodity prices—ﬁrst
for a large country, then for a small one. We conclude with a viewpoint
based on reverse causality: the possible inﬂuence of commodity prices on
monetary policy in a consideration of what price index to use for the nom-
inal anchor. Even if one is wedded to, say, a Taylor rule, the question of
what price index to use merits discussion. The author summarizes a pro-
posal made elsewhere, for countries with volatile terms of trade, to use an
export price index (or producer price index) in place of the CPI. If one is en-
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3. For young readers, I will recall that these distinctions were originally due to Arthur Okun
(1975), who called the two sectors auction goods versus customer goods.amored of a simpler price-targeting regime, then the proposal is to Peg the
Export Price Index (PEPI) in place of targeting the CPI.
7.2 The Eﬀect of Monetary Policy on Real Commodity Prices
The central purpose of this chapter is to assert the claim that monetary
policy, as reﬂected in real interest rates, is an important—and usually un-
derappreciated—determinant of the real prices of oil and other mineral
and agricultural products, while far from the only determinant.
7.2.1 Eﬀect of U.S. Short-Term Real Interest Rates 
on Real U.S. Commodity Prices
The argument can be stated in an intuitive way that might appeal to
practitioners as follows. High interest rates reduce the demand for storable
commodities, or increase the supply, through a variety of channels:
• By increasing the incentive for extraction today rather than tomorrow
(think of the rates at which oil is pumped, zinc is mined, forests logged,
or livestock herds culled)
• By decreasing ﬁrms’ desire to carry inventories (think of oil invento-
ries held in tanks)
• By encouraging speculators to shift out of commodity contracts (es-
pecially spot contracts) and into treasury bills
All three mechanisms work to reduce the market price of commodities, as
happened when real interest rates were high in the early 1980s. A decrease
in real interest rates has the opposite eﬀect, lowering the cost of carrying
inventories and raising commodity prices, as happened during 2002 to
2004. Call it part of the “carry trade.”4
Theory: The Overshooting Model
The theoretical model can be summarized as follows. A monetary con-
traction temporarily raises the real interest rate, whether via a rise in the
nominal interest rate, a fall in expected inﬂation, or both. Real commodity
prices fall. How far? Until commodities are widely considered “underval-
ued”—so undervalued that there is an expectation of future appreciation
(together with other advantages of holding inventories, namely the “con-
venience yield”) that is suﬃcient to oﬀset the higher interest rate (and other
costs of carrying inventories: storage costs plus any risk premium). Only
then, when expected returns are in balance, are ﬁrms willing to hold the in-
ventories despite the high carrying cost. In the long run, the general price
level adjusts to the change in the money supply. As a result, the real money
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4. See Frankel (2005b).supply, real interest rate, and real commodity price eventually return to
where they were.
The theory is the same as Rudiger Dornbusch’s (1976) famous theory of
exchange rate overshooting, with the price of commodities substituted for
the price of foreign exchange—and with convenience yield substituted for
the foreign interest rate. The deep reason for the overshooting phenome-
non is that prices for agricultural and mineral products adjust rapidly,
while most other prices adjust slowly.5
The theory can be reduced to its simplest algebraic essence as a claimed
relationship between the real interest rate and the spot price of a commod-
ity relative to its expected long-run equilibrium price. This relationship can
be derived from two simple assumptions. The ﬁrst one governs expecta-
tions. Let
s   the spot price,
s    its long run equilibrium,
p   the economy-wide price index,
q   s   p, the real price of the commodity, and
q    the long run equilibrium real price of the commodity,
all in log form. Market participants who observe the real price of the com-
modity today lying above or below its perceived long-run value expect it in
the future to regress back to equilibrium over time, at an annual rate that
is proportionate to the gap:
(1) E[ (s   p)]   E[ q]      (q   q  )
or
(2) E( s)      (q   q  )   E( p).
Following the classic Dornbusch overshooting paper, we begin by simply
asserting the reasonableness of the form of expectations in these equations:
a tendency to regress back toward long-run equilibrium. But, as in that pa-
per, it can be shown that regressive expectations are also rational expecta-
tions, under certain assumptions regarding the stickiness of other goods
prices (manufacturers and services) and certain restrictions on parameter
values.6
Equation (3) concerns the decision whether to hold the commodity for
another period—either leaving it in the ground or on the trees or holding
it in inventories—or to sell it at today’s price and deposit the proceeds in
the bank to earn interest. The arbitrage condition is that the expected rate
of return to these two alternative courses of action must be the same:
(3) E s   c   i,
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5. See Frankel (1984).
6. See Frankel (1986).where 
c   cy – sc – rp
cy   convenience yield from holding the stock (e.g., the insurance value of
having an assured supply of some critical input in the event of a disrup-
tion, or in the case of gold, the psychic pleasure component of holding it), 
sc   storage costs (e.g., costs of security to prevent plundering by others,
rental rate on oil tanks or oil tankers, etc.) 
rp   risk premium, which is positive if being long in commodities is risky,
and 
i   the interest rate.7
There is no reason why the convenience yield, storage costs, or risk pre-
mium should be constant over time. If one is interested in the derivatives
markets, the forward discount or slope of the futures curve, f – s in log
terms, is given by:
(4) f   s   i   cy   sc, or equivalently by E s   rp.
Parenthetically, the introduction to this chapter noted that conventional
wisdom initially regarded the 2003 to 2004 “spike” in oil prices as only tem-
porary, but expectations regarding the long-run oil price were subse-
quently revised sharply upward. The changes in the perceived transience or
permanence of the price increase were standardly based on the futures
markets, which did not catch up with the increase in the spot price until af-
ter a year or so. It is curious that so many economists and central bankers
are ready to accept that the futures price of oil is an unbiased forecast of
the future spot price. This proposition, of course, would follow from the
two propositions that the futures price is an accurate measure of expecta-
tions (no risk premium) and that expectations are rational. Both halves of
the joint hypothesis are open to question. Few familiar with the statistics
of forward exchange rates claim that they are an unbiased predictor of the
future spot exchange rate. Few familiar with the statistics of the interest
rate term structure claim that the long-term interest rate contains an unbi-
ased predictor of future short-term interest rates. Why, then, expect the oil
futures price to be an unbiased predictor of the future spot price?8 The
convenience yield, storage costs, and risk premium are variable. So the
backwardation (forward prices below spot) in oil prices in 2004 was not
necessarily a reason to be complacent, and the ﬂattening or contango (for-
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7. Working (1949) and Breeden (1980) are classic references on the roles of carrying costs
and the risk premium, respectively, in commodity markets. Yang, Bessler, and Leatham
(2001) review the literature.
8. Studies of bias in the commodities futures price as a predictor of the spot price include
Bessembinder (1993), Brenner and Kroner (1995), Covey and Bessler (1995), Dusak (1973),
Fama and French (1987), Fortenbery and Zapata (1997), and Kolb (1992). Most assume that
investors’ expectations must be unbiased in-sample, and infer a time varying risk premium.
The exception, Choe (1990), infers expectations from survey data.ward prices above spot) in 2005 to 2006 was not necessarily a reason to
worry.
Nevertheless, the large increase in the slope of the futures yield curve
during the period 2004 to 2006, the same period that the Federal Reserve
was steadily raising interest rates, is consistent with the theory that we have
just developed: that the slope depends on the interest rate plus storage
costs minus convenience yield. Harder to explain is that the move to con-
tango came rather sharply, however, in early April 2005, rather than grad-
ually. Here a rapid revision in expectations may have played a role.
To get our main result, we simply combine equations (2) and (3):
(5)   (q   q  )   E( p)   c   i →
q   q     (1/ )[i   E( p)   c].
Equation (5) says that the real price of the commodity (measured relative
to its long-run equilibrium) is inversely proportional to the real interest
rate (measured relative to a constant term that depends on convenience
yield). When the real interest rate is high, as in the 1980s, money ﬂows out
of commodities, just as it ﬂows out of foreign currencies, emerging mar-
kets, and other securities. Only when the prices of these alternative assets
are perceived to lie suﬃciently below their future equilibriums will the ar-
bitrage condition be met. Conversely, when the real interest rate is low, as
in 2001 to 2005, money ﬂows into commodities, just as it ﬂows into foreign
currencies, emerging markets, and other securities. Only when the prices of
these alternative assets are perceived to lie suﬃciently above their future
equilibriums will the arbitrage condition be met.
The Simplest Test
One can imagine a number of ways of testing the theory.
One way of isolating the macroeconomic eﬀects on commodity prices is
to look at jumps in ﬁnancial markets that occur in immediate response to
government announcements that change perceptions of monetary policy,
as was true of Fed money supply announcements in the early 1980s. Money
announcements that caused interest rates to jump up would, on average,
cause commodity prices to fall, and vice versa. The experiment is interest-
ing because news regarding supply disruptions and so forth is unlikely to
have come out during the short time intervals in question.9
The relationship between the real commodity price and the real interest
rate, equation (5), can also be tested more directly because variables can be
measured fairly easily.10 This is the test we pursue here.
We begin with a look at some plots. Three major price indexes that have
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9. See Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985).
10. One precedent is Barsky and Summers (1988, part III), who established an inverse re-
lationship between the real interest rate and the real prices of gold and nonferrous metals.been available since 1950—from Dow Jones, Commodity Resources Board,
and Moody’s—are used in the ﬁrst three ﬁgures. (In addition, two others,
which started later than 1950, are illustrated in appendix A). To compute
the real commodity price, we take the log of the commodity price index
minus the log of the CPI. To compute the real interest rate, we take the one-
year interest rate and subtract oﬀ the one-year inﬂation rate observed over
the preceding year.
The negative relationship predicted by the theory seems to hold. We next
apply ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to these data.
It would not be reasonable to expect the regression relationship to hold
precisely in practice. It would be foolish to think that the equation captures
everything. In reality, a lot of other things beyond real interest rates inﬂu-
ence commodity prices. There are bound to be ﬂuctuations both in q  , the
long-run equilibrium real price, and c, which includes convenience yield,
storage costs, and risk premium. These ﬂuctuations are not readily measur-
able.11Such factors as weather, political vicissitudes in producing countries,
and so forth, are likely to be very important when looking at individual
commodities. Indeed, analysts of oil or coﬀee or copper pay rather little
attention to macroeconomic inﬂuences and, instead, spend their time look-
ing at microeconomic determinants. Oil prices have been high in 2004 to
2006 in large part due to booming demand from China and feared supply
disruptions in the Middle East, Russia, Nigeria, and Venezuela. There may
now be a premium built in to the convenience yield arising from the possi-
bilities of supply disruption related to terrorism, uncertainty in the Persian
Gulf, and related risks. Yet another factor concerns the proposition that the
world supply of oil may be peaking in this decade, as new discoveries lag
behind consumption (Hubbert’s Peak12). This would imply that q  , the world
long-run equilibrium real price of oil has shifted upward. Other factors
apply to other commodities. In coﬀee, the large-scale entry of Vietnam into
the market lowered prices sharply a few years ago. Corn, sugar, and cotton
are heavily inﬂuenced by protectionist measures and subsidies in many
countries and so on (see ﬁgure 7.1).
Such eﬀects in individual commodities partially average out when look-
ing at a basket average of commodity prices. This is one reason to use ag-
gregate indexes in the tests reported in the following.
Table 7.1 reports regressions of real commodity prices over the period
1950 to 2005. The results are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level for
all three of the major price indexes that have been available since 1950—
from Dow Jones, Commodity Resources Board (CRB), and Moody’s—and
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11. An extension for future research would be to attempt to control for some inﬂuences on
c by means of measures of economic activity and risk such as those used in the inventories
equation in the next section.
12. See Deﬀeyers (2005). Notwithstanding that such predictions have in the past been
proven wrong.Fig. 7.1 U.S. real commodity prices and real interest rates, annual 1950–2005: 
A, CRB commodity price index versus real interest rate; B, Dow Jones commodity
price index versus real interest rate; C, Moody’s commodity price index versus real
interest rate
Source: Global Financial Data.
B
Asigniﬁcant for one of the two with a shorter history (Goldman Sachs). All
are of the hypothesized negative sign. The estimated coeﬃcient for the
CRB, –.06, is typical. It suggests that when the real interest rate goes up 
1 percentage point (100 basis points), it lowers the real commodity price 
by .06, that is, 6 percent. It also suggests that the estimate for 1/  6, so 
  .16. In other words, the expected speed of adjustment per year is esti-
mated at 16 percent. The expected half-life is about four years (.84 to the
4th power  .5).
Table 7.1 also reports results for twenty-three individual commodities,
presented in order of the size of the estimated coeﬃcient. Despite our fears
that sector-speciﬁc microeconomic factors swamp the macroeconomic in-
ﬂuences for individual commodities, the coeﬃcient is of the hypothesized
sign in nineteen out of twenty-three cases and is statistically signiﬁcant in
half (eleven out of twenty-three). Interestingly, oil and gold are the worst
of the twenty-three, showing (insigniﬁcant) positive coeﬃcients! A ﬁxed
eﬀects panel incorporates the information for all the individual commodi-
ties with the coeﬃcient constrained to be the same. The coeﬃcient is esti-
mated at –.046 and is highly signiﬁcant statistically.
The results in table 7.1 suggest that the signiﬁcant negative relationship
between commodity prices and interest rates is reasonably robust across
commodity price measures. Is the result as robust over time? It appears that
the negative correlation is signiﬁcant over 1950 to 1979 (see appendix table
7A.1, panel A). However, since 1980, there does not appear to have been a
stable relationship between log real commodity prices and the real interest
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C
Fig. 7.1 (cont.) rate (see appendix table 7A.1, panel B). The same is true if the sample is di-
vided at 1976 or 1982.
An Eﬀect on Inventories?
Because one of the hypothesized mechanisms of transmission from real
interest rates to real commodity prices runs via the demand for inventories,
it may be instructive to look at inventory data. Appendixes B and C report
regression results for oil inventories (see appendix tables 7B.1 and 7C.1).
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Table 7.1 Regression of log real commodity prices on real interest rates,
1950–2005: results by commodity indices, individual commodities, and
ﬁxed eﬀects panel of commodities
Coeﬃcient SE
Sample: 1950–2005 (56 annual observations)
Goldman Sachs (1969–) –0.080 0.029**
Dow Jones –0.070 0.023**
CRB –0.060 0.024**
Moodys –0.058 0.014**
Reuters (1959–) –0.009 0.024
Commodities
Sugar –0.144 0.035**























Source: Global Financial Data.
Notes:Real interest rate in percentages and real commodity prices in log units. Commodities
are listed by coeﬃcient in ascending order. SE   standard error.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.The coeﬃcient on the real interest rate is often negative, as hypothesized.
It is not always statistically signiﬁcant, until we control for three other
standard determinants of inventory demand, as in table 7.2. The following
are the three other determinants:
• Industrial production, representing the transactions demand for in-
ventories. Higher economic activity should have a positive eﬀect on
the demand for inventory holdings.
• Risk (political, ﬁnancial, and economic) among a weighted average of
twelve top oil producers. In our measure, a rise in the index represents
a decrease in risk, which should have a negative eﬀect on the demand
for inventories.
• The spot-futures spread. Intuitively the futures-spot spread reﬂects
the speculative return to holding inventories.13 A higher spot-futures
spread, or lower future-spot spread, signiﬁes a low speculative return
and should have a negative eﬀect on inventory demand.
More formally, equation (4) gives us the arbitrage condition relevant for
ﬁrms deciding whether to incur storage costs:
i   cy   sc   E s   rp.
We substitute in the arbitrage condition that comes from the ﬁnancial
speculators,
f   s   E s   rp,
and solve for storage costs.
sc   f   s   cy   i
Storage costs rise with the extent to which inventory holdings strain exist-
ing storage capacity:
sc    (inventories).
Invert the equation for the supply of inventory storage capacity, and set in-
ventory demand equal to supply:
(6) inventories     1(sc)
    1[cy   i   (s   f )].
We see from the equation that inventory holdings are positively related to
convenience yield (which is, in turn, determined by industrial production
and geopolitical risk) and negatively related to the interest rate and the
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13. For example, see the discussion of Figure 1.22 in the World Economic Outlook, April
2006, Washington, DC, International Monetary Fund; Abosedra and Radchenko (2003); or
Balabanoﬀ (1995).spot-futures spread (two components of the opportunity cost of holding
inventories).
Equation (6) is a model of the stock of inventories that ﬁrms desire to
hold. In practice, the actual level of inventories generally deviates from the
desired levels. For example, a sudden unexpected acceleration of industrial
production will, in the short run, show up as a fallin inventories held, even
though the desired level of inventories goes up. Only over time are ﬁrms
able to adjust their actual level of inventories in line with the desired level.
This phenomenon is very well known and was the origin of the “stock ad-
justment” speciﬁcation in regression equations. For our purposes, it
simply means we want to include a lagged endogenous variable and that we
should expect its eﬀect on current measured inventories to be very strong.
The results are reported in table 7.2. They show the hypothesized sign on
all variables, usually with statistical signiﬁcance.14 They, thus, generally
support the model.
We have also looked at agricultural inventories, as reported in appendix
table 7D.1. Here there is little evidence of an eﬀect of real interest rates. But
in this case we were unable to control for risk or other important variables,
so perhaps this ﬁnding is to be expected.
7.2.2 The Relationship in Other Countries
In the preceding analysis, we have expressed everything—nominal com-
modity prices, CPI, interest rates—in dollars. But the United States is not
the whole world. It is less than 1/3 of Gross World Product, even if its im-
portance in monetary and ﬁnancial markets is evidently greater than that.
In this section, we consider other countries, concentrating on those that
currently have ﬂoating exchange rates and, thus, are in need of a price tar-
get to anchor monetary policy. We will treat them as “small open econ-
omies,” meaning that they take the world price of commodities as given,
even though they range in size up to the United Kingdom.
Adding Exchange Rate Overshooting to Commodity Price Overshooting
We could begin by redoing the previous econometrics with global mea-
sures of each of the variables, that is, measuring the commodity price in a
GDP-weighted average of the dollar, euro, yen, and so on, measuring the
world interest rate as a weighted average of national interest rates and mea-
suring the CPI and inﬂation rates as the same-weighted average of national
CPIs and inﬂation rates. But we leave this as a possible extension for future
research. Instead, we take the U.S. variables to be the global variables, and
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14. Indeed, these other determinants are suﬃciently successful in the inventory equation as
to suggest that one include them in the regression estimates of equation (5), where they would
serve as determinants of c. Perhaps the addition of such controls would improve the estimates
of the macroeconomic inﬂuences on the prices of oil and other commodities. This extension
is left for future research.we proceed directly to look at small countries that by deﬁnition take the
U.S./global variables as given.
The log spot price of the commodity in terms of currency j is given by
(7) sj   s( j/$)   s($/c),
where s(j/$) is the spot exchange rate in units of currency j per $ and s($/c) is
the spot price of commodity c in terms of $, what has hitherto been called
simply s for the dollar case. The real exchange rate between currency j and
the dollar is governed by the direct application of the Dornbusch over-
shooting model.




 {ij   i$   [E( pj)   E( p$)]}
Combining equations (5), (7), and (8),
(9) (s( j/c)   s  ( j/c))   (s( j/$)   s  ( j/$))   (s($/c)   s  ($/c)) 
  (pj   p  j)    
υ
1
 {ij   i$   [E( pj)   E( p$)]}
   
1
 
 [i$   E( p$)   c]
(q( j/c)   q  ( j/c))     
υ
1
 (rj   r$)   (1/ )(r$   c),
where r$ is the U.S. interest rate, and rj is the interest rate in country j.
Equation (9) says the real commodity price observed in country j will be
high to the extent either that the local real interest rate is low relative to the
U.S. real rate or to the extent that the U.S. real interest rate is low. We tested
this equation for eight individual countries that currently have indepen-
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Table 7.2 Relationship between oil inventories and real interest rates (weekly data;
1,114–1,190 observations depending on data availability)
Real Inventories
interest rate Spot-futures IP  IP Risk  risk (t – 1)
Nonstationary variables detrended by including quadratic terms in each regression
–0.394** –0.821** 0.397** –0.002**
(0.089) (0.041) (0.062) (0.001)
–0.056 –0.079** 0.052** 0.000 0.931**
(0.032) (0.013) (0.020) (0.000) (0.009)
–0.211** –0.727** 0.131 –0.005**
(0.085) (0.040) (0.126) (0.001)
–0.017 –0.071** 0.009 0.000 0.937**
(0.032) (0.012) (0.045) (0.000) (0.009)
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.dently ﬂoating currencies (though they did not all have ﬂoating rates
throughout the entire sample period).
We computed the real commodity price by converting the commodity
price to the currency of the small open economy in question and dividing
by the country’s price level. We then regressed the log of the real commod-
ity price on the two variables on the right-hand side of equation (9), the
U.S. real interest rate and the diﬀerential in real interest rates between the
small open economy and the United States:
log       1[(ij    j)   (iUS    US)]    2(iUS    US)   ε.
The results for the eight ﬂoating countries are reported in table 7.3, which
uses six diﬀerent commodity price indexes: CRB, Dow Jones, The Econo-
mist, Goldman Sachs, Moody’s, and Reuters. Monthly data were generally
available for the developed countries from 1950.15 To take full advantage 
of what data were available, the regressions were estimated separately for
the three-month interest rate (three-month Treasury notes or equivalent)
and the long-term interest rate with the largest sample (Australia: ten-
year bond; Brazil: thirty-year bond; Canada: ten  year bond; Chile:
twenty-year bond; Mexico: three-year bond; New Zealand: ten-year bond;
Switzerland: thirty-year bond; United Kingdom: twenty-year bond). The
U.S. interest rate for each regression was chosen to match the maturity of
the bond from the small open economy.
In general, the evidence appears to support the hypothesis regarding the
determination of the log real local-currency index of commodity prices.
The estimates show a signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient on the real U.S. inter-
est rate, representing global monetary policy, as well as on the real interest
differential between the national economy and the United States, repre-
senting local variations in monetary stance. Often, signiﬁcance levels are
high. In the case of the three major English-speaking countries, Australia,
Canada, and the United Kingdom, both the coeﬃcient on the U.S. real in-
terest rate and the coeﬃcient on the real interest diﬀerential are statistically
signiﬁcant and of the hypothesized negative sign in almost every one of 
the twelve cases, regardless of which of the six commodity price indexes 
are used and regardless of whether short-term or long-term interest rates
are used. The results for New Zealand and Switzerland are almost as
strong but for the eﬀect of the short-term U.S. rate, as are the results for
Brazil and Chile, except that the coeﬃcient on the long-term real interest
diﬀerential is not always signiﬁcant. The only disappointing country is
Mexico, where even though the short-term real interest diﬀerential always
CPUS   Sj/$
  
Pj
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15. For the three Latin American countries, however, it was diﬃcult to ﬁnd interest rate







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































lappears signiﬁcantly less than zero, the U.S. interest rate appears signiﬁ-
cantly greater than zero rather than less.
This seems impressive evidence for what has been the central theme of
this chapter so far. The hypothesized eﬀect of the real interest rate on real
commodity prices works not only at the U.S. level, but also at the level of
local variation among open economies above and beyond the global phe-
nomenon.
7.3 Implications for Monetary Policy
We conclude the chapter with a consideration of some implications for
monetary policymakers. The ﬁrst implication is a reason to add commod-
ity prices to the list of variables that central banks monitor, regardless of
their regime—that is, regardless of whether they use discretion or some rule
or intermediate target and, in the latter case, regardless of the rule or target
that is oﬃcially declared. The second implication concerns the possibility,
in the case of countries where ﬂuctuations in the terms of trade are impor-
tant, of giving export prices a larger role in the price index that enters the
rule or target than does the CPI (whether headline CPI or core CPI).
7.3.1 Commodity Prices Belong on the List of 
Monetary Conditions Indicators
The advice that monetary policymakers should “look at everything”
sounds easy to give and hard to reject. But not everyone would consider 
it obvious that an index of agricultural and mineral commodity prices
belongs on a useful list of variables to reveal current monetary conditions,
alongside short- and long-term interest rates, the exchange rate, housing
prices, and the stock market. The conventional practice is to throw the
volatile “food and energy” sector out of the price indexes, concentrating
instead on the core CPI if one wants a good indicator of likely future in-
ﬂation. It is certainly true that if one is looking for the single standard sta-
tistic that best predicts future inﬂation, the core CPI will do better than
the headline CPI. But that is not the question. The question is, rather, if
one is free to look at lots of information, are agricultural and mineral
prices on the list of variables worth paying attention to? This perspective
places this chapter on a plane with other chapters that consider the possi-
bility of central banks paying attention to housing prices or the stock
market.
The theory and empirical results reported in this chapter suggest that the
answer is yes. Real commodity prices reﬂect monetary ease, more speciﬁ-
cally real interest rates, among other factors. We can never be sure what the
real interest rate is because we do not directly observe expected inﬂation.
Thus, it is useful to have additional data that are thought to reﬂect real in-
terest rates.
The Effect of Monetary Policy on Real Commodity Prices 3117.3.2 What Prices Belong in the Inﬂation Targeters’ Target?
The current fashion in monetary policy regimes is inﬂation targeting.
Such countries as the United Kingdom, Sweden, Canada, New Zealand,
Australia, Chile, Brazil, Norway, Korea, and South Africa have adopted it,
and many monetary economists approve. In part, this is a consequence of
the disillusionment with exchange rate targets that arose in the course of
ten years of currency crises (from the speculative attack that forced the
United Kingdom to drop out of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism
in 1992 to the Argentina crisis of 2001). Proponents of inﬂation targeting
point out that if the exchange rate is not to be the anchor for monetary pol-
icy, then the ultimate objective of price stability requires that some new
nominal variable must be chosen as the anchor. Two old favorite candi-
dates for nominal anchor, the price of gold and the money supply, have
long since been discredited in the eyes of many. So that seems to leave in-
ﬂation targeting. One version of a generalized approach to inﬂation tar-
geting is a Taylor rule, which puts weight on output in addition to inﬂation.
But whether it is simple inﬂation targeting or a Taylor rule, what price
index is appropriate? Of the possible price indexes that a central bank
could target, the CPI is the usual choice. Indeed, the CPI (whether core or
overall CPI) seems to be virtually the only choice that central banks and
economists have even considered. But this is not the only possible choice.
A proposal made elsewhere is to target an index of export prices.
7.3.3 The Proposal to Peg the Export Price (PEP)
This idea is a more moderate version of an exotic-sounding proposed
monetary regime called Peg the Export Price (PEP). The author originally
proposed PEP explicitly for those countries that happen to be heavily spe-
cialized in the production of a particular mineral or agricultural export
commodity. The proposal was to ﬁx the price of that commodity in terms
of domestic currency, or, equivalently, set the value of domestic currency in
terms of that commodity. For example, African gold producers would peg
their currency to gold—in eﬀect returning to the long-abandoned gold
standard. Canada and Australia would peg to wheat. Norway would peg
to oil. Chile would peg to copper, and so forth. One can even think of ex-
porters of manufactured goods that qualify: standardized semiconductors
(that is, commodity chips) are suﬃciently important exports in Korea that
one could imagine it pegging the won to the price of chips.
How would this work operationally? Conceptually, one can imagine the
government holding reserves of gold or oil and intervening whenever nec-
essary to keep the price ﬁxed in terms of local currency. Operationally, a
more practical method would be for the central bank each day to announce
an exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar, following the rule that the day’s ex-
change rate target (dollars per local currency unit) moves precisely in pro-
portion to the day’s price of gold or oil on the London market or New York
312 Jeffrey A. Frankelmarket (dollars per commodity). Then the central bank could intervene via
the foreign exchange market to achieve the day’s target. Either way, the
eﬀect would be to stabilize the price of the commodity in terms of local cur-
rency. Or perhaps, because these commodity prices are determined on
world markets, a better way to express the same policy is “stabilizing the
price of local currency in terms of the commodity.”16
The PEP proposal can be made more moderate and more appropriate
for diversiﬁed economies, in a number of ways, as explained in the next sub-
section.17 One way is to interpret it as targeting a broad index of all export
prices, rather than the price of only one or a few export commodities. This
moderate form of the proposal is abbreviated PEPI, for Peg the Export
Price Index.18
The argument for the export price targeting proposal, in any of its forms,
is stated succinctly: it delivers one of the main advantages that a simple ex-
change rate peg promises, namely a nominal anchor, while simultaneously
delivering one of the main advantages that a ﬂoating regime promises,
namely automatic adjustment in the face of ﬂuctuations in the prices of the
countries’ exports on world markets. Textbook theory says that when there
is an adverse movement in the terms of trade, it is desirable to accommo-
date it via a depreciation of the currency. When the dollar price of exports
rises, under PEP or PEPI, the currency per force appreciates in terms of
dollars. When the dollar price of exports falls, the currency depreciates in
terms of dollars. Such accommodation of terms of trade shocks is precisely
what is wanted. In recent currency crises, countries that suﬀered a sharp
deterioration in their export markets were often eventually forced to give
up their exchange rate targets and devalue anyway, but the adjustment was
far more painful—in terms of lost reserves, lost credibility, and lost out-
put—than if the depreciation had happened automatically.
But the proposal is not just for countries with volatile commodity ex-
ports. The desirability of accommodating terms of trade shocks is a good
way to summarize the attractiveness of export price targeting relative to the
reigning champion, CPI targeting.19Consider the two categories of adverse
terms of trade shocks: a fall in the dollar price of the export in world mar-
kets and a rise in the dollar price of the import on world markets. In the ﬁrst
case, a fall in the export price, you want the local currency to depreciate
against the dollar. As already noted, PEP or PEPI deliver that result auto-
matically; CPI targeting does not. In the second case, a rise in the import
price, the terms-of-trade criterion suggests that you again want the local
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16. Frankel (2002, 2003) and Frankel and Saiki (2002).
17. Another way to go is to deﬁne as the parity a basket that includes the export commod-
ity as well as a weighted average of currencies of major trading partners—for example, 1/3
dollars, 1/3 euros, and 1/3 oil, as the author has proposed for Persian Gulf states.
18. See Frankel (2005a).
19. Among many possible references are Bernanke et al. (1999), Mankiw and Reis (2003),
Svensson (1995, 1999), Svennson and Woodford (2005), and Truman (2003).currency to depreciate.20 Consumer Price Index targeting actually has the
implication that you tighten monetary policy so as to appreciate the cur-
rency against the dollar, by enough to prevent the local currency price of
imports from rising. This implication—reacting to an adverse terms of
trade shock by appreciating the currency—seems perverse. It could be ex-
pected to exacerbate swings in the trade balance and output.
Few believe that the proper response for an oil-importing country in the
event of a large increase in world oil prices is to tighten monetary policy
and thereby appreciate the currency suﬃciently to prevent an increase in
the price of oil in terms of domestic currency. The usual defense of inﬂation
targeting oﬀered by its many proponents is that in the event of such a
shock, the central bank can easily deviate from the CPI target and explain
the circumstances to the public. But what can be the argument for making
such derogations on an ad hoc basis, when it is possible to build them into
a simple target rule in the ﬁrst place? Certainly not a gain in transparency
and credibility.
This is not to suggest that this regime would be appropriate for all coun-
tries, only that it might have advantages for countries that experience large
volatility in their terms of trade. But it has become apparent in this decade
that terms of trade volatility is a more serious issue than was believed in the
1980s and 1990s.
To summarize, the argument for PEPI over CPI targeting is twofold.
First, CPI targeting requires tightening in the face of an increase in the
world price of import commodities, such as oil for an oil importer, while
PEPI does not. Second, PEPI allows accommodation of ﬂuctuations in the
world price of the export commodities, while CPI targeting does not.
7.3.4 Moderate Version: Peg the Export Price Index
The second of the two arguments for the PEPI proposal just given is to
eliminate export price variability. The stability in export prices, in turn,
would help stabilize the balance of payments. It would, for example, have
allowed the Korean won to depreciate automatically in the late 1990s,
without the need for a costly failed attempt to defend an exchange rate tar-
get before the devaluation.21 It would have allowed the Malaysian ringgit
314 Jeffrey A. Frankel
20. Neither regime delivers that result. There is a reason for this. In addition to the goal of
accommodating terms of trade shocks, there is also the goal of resisting inﬂation, but to de-
preciate in the face of an increase in import prices would exacerbate price instability.
21. Earlier research reported simulations of the path of exports over the last three decades
if countries had followed the PEP proposal, as compared to hypothetical rigid pegs to a ma-
jor currency, or as compared to whatever policy the country in fact followed historically:
Frankel (2002) focuses primarily on producers of gold, Frankel (2003) on oil exporters, and
Frankel and Saiki (2002) on various other agricultural and mineral producers. A typical ﬁnd-
ing was that developing countries that suﬀered a deterioration in export markets in the late
1990s, often contributing to a ﬁnancial crisis, would have adjusted automatically under the
PEP regime.to appreciate automatically in the early 2000s, without the need for the
monetary authorities to abandon their nominal anchor, as they did for-
mally in 2005.
How would PEPI be implemented operationally? That is, how would an
index of export prices be stabilized? As noted, in the simple version of the
PEP proposal, there is nothing to prevent a central bank from intervening
to ﬁx the price of a single agricultural or mineral product perfectly on a
day-to-day basis. Such perfect price ﬁxing is not possible in the case of a
broad basket of exports, as called for by PEPI, even if it were desirable. For
one thing, such price indexes are not even computed on a daily basis. So it
would be, rather, a matter of setting a target zone for the year, with monthly
realizations, much as a range for the CPI is declared under the most stan-
dard interpretation of inﬂation targeting.
The declared band could be wide if desired, just as with the targeting of
the CPI, money supply, exchange rate, or other nominal variables. Open
market operations to keep the export price index inside the band if it
threatens to stray outside could be conducted in terms either of foreign ex-
change or in terms of domestic securities. For some countries, it might help
to monitor on a daily or weekly basis the price of a basket of agricultural
and mineral commodities that is as highly correlated as possible with the
country’s overall price index, but whose components are observable on a
daily or weekly basis in well-organized markets. The central bank could
even announce what the value of the basket index would be one week at a
time, by analogy with the Fed funds target in the United States. The weekly
targets could be set so as to achieve the medium-term goal of keeping the
comprehensive price index inside the preannounced bands, and yet the
central bank could hit the weekly targets very closely, if it wanted, for ex-
ample, by intervening in the foreign exchange market.
A ﬁrst step for any central bank wishing to dip its toe in these waters
would be to compute a monthly index of export prices and publish it. A
second step would be to announce that it was “monitoring” the index. The
data requirements for computing such an index would not be great. Every
country’s customs services gathers data on trade volumes and prices; in-
deed, they tend to do so at earlier stages of development than they gather
data on national income or the CPI. For countries that lack fully credible
institutions, an added advantage of the PEP proposal is transparency: the
components tend to be more readily observable than components of the
CPI such as prices of housing or other nontraded services.
A still more moderate, still less exotic-sounding, version of the PEPI
proposal would be to target a producer price index (PPI) or the GDP de-
ﬂator. In practice, it can be diﬃcult to separate production cleanly into the
two sectors, nontraded goods and exportables, in which case the two ver-
sions of the proposal—targeting an export price index or a producer price
index—come down to the same thing. The key point of the PEP proposal
The Effect of Monetary Policy on Real Commodity Prices 315is to exclude import prices from the index and to include export prices (as
the PPI also does). The problem with CPI targeting is that it does it the
other way around.
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Fig. 7A.1 U.S. real commodity prices and real interest rates: A, Goldman Sachs
commodity price index versus real interest rate, annual 1969–2005; B, Reuters com-
modity price index versus real interest rate, annual 1959–2005
Source: Global Financial Data.
A
BTable 7A.1 Regression of log real commodity prices on real interest rates,
1950–2005: results by commodity indexes, individual commodities, 
and ﬁxed eﬀects panel.
Coeﬃcient SE
A. 1950–1979 (30 annual observations)
Reuters (1959–) –0.080 0.023**
Goldman Sachs (1969–) –0.078 0.028**















Fixed eﬀects panel –0.056 0.006**
Coﬀee –0.055 0.028
Oats –0.053 0.015**










B. 1980–2005 (26 annual observations)
Moodys 0.014 0.018
Goldman Sachs 0.033 0.030












Relationship between Detrended Oil 
Inventories and Interest Rates
We have used various methods to detrend the inventories series: linear,
quadratic and the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁlter. To maximize smoothness,
the largest possible smoothness parameter was chosen for the HP ﬁlter (1
billion). At this level of smoothness, the HP ﬁlter series resembled those
generated using the linear or quadratic method.
Graphs show the linear and quadratic detrended series (see ﬁgure 7B.1).
Regressions
Six regressions have been estimated to explore this relationship (see table
7B.1).
• In regression 1, there is no detrending.
• In regressions 2 and 3, linear ( t) or quadratic trends ( t  t2) are in-
cluded as extra regressors.
• Regressions 4 to 6 use a two step procedure, ﬁrst detrending the in-
ventories series and then estimating the relationship.






Fixed eﬀects panel 0.072 0.008**
Gold 0.078 0.037**










Source: Global Financial Data.
Notes: Real interest rates in percentages and real commodity prices in log units. Commodi-
ties are listed by coeﬃcient in ascending order. SE   standard error.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
Table 7A.1 (continued)
Coeﬃcient SEFig. 7B.1 October 1982 to September 2005, weekly: A, oil inventories detrended;
B, real interest rates and oil inventories
Table 7B.1 Relationship between oil inventories and interest rates
Real rate Standard
Regressand Regressors coeﬃcient error
1. Inventories Real rate 5.96 0.29*
2. Inventories Real rate and linear trend –0.69 0.35*
3. Inventories Real rate and quadratic trend –0.36 0.35
4. Linear detrended inventories Real rate –0.31 0.23
5. Quadratic detrended inventories Real rate –0.17 0.23
6. Hodrick-Prescott detrended inventories Real rate 0.04 0.22
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
A
BWhen the linear detrending method is used, there is a signiﬁcant negative
relationship between the real rate and inventories. However, this result is
not robust to the use of alternative detrending methods if one fails to con-
trol for other important inﬂuences on inventory demand.
Appendix C
Relationship between Detrended Oil Inventories and Real
Interest Rates Controlling for Additional Regressors
This appendix estimates an inventory equation controlling for three re-
gressors, beyond the interest rate: risk in oil exporters, industrial activity in
importing countries, and the spot-futures spread.
1: Risk in Oil Exporting Countries (Used As a 
Measure of Risk of Supply Disruptions)
We obtained monthly data from the Political Risk Services (PRS) Group
on the “composite risk” for each of the top twelve oil exporting countries.
The composite risk ratings cover political risk, economic risk, and ﬁnan-
cial risk. We have constructed a single measure for the top twelve oil ex-
porters by arithmetically weighting the composite risk rating for each
country by the country’s share of world oil exports in 2003 and 2004. The
countries included are (in descending order of importance): Saudi Arabia,
Russia/USSR, Norway, Iran, Venezuela, United Arab Emirates (UAE),
Kuwait, Nigeria, Mexico, Algeria, Libya and Iraq. A fall in the index rep-
resents an increase in risk. Since the series trends up over time, we have
made the series stationary by detrending or diﬀerencing. When diﬀerenc-
ing, we use a relatively tight twelve-week change so there is not a large
phase shift (see ﬁgure 7C.1).
2: Industrial Countries’ Industrial Production 
(a Measure of Changes in Demand)
A monthly series of Industrial Production in Industrial Countries has
been obtained from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Interna-
tional Financial Statistics (IFS) database. Because the data were not sea-
sonally adjusted and displayed a strong seasonal pattern, we seasonally ad-
justed the data using the X-12-ARIMA algorithm provided in the software
Demetra. The series trended up, so detrending or diﬀerencing have been
used to make the series stationary:
3: Spot—Futures Price Spread
The spot-futures price spread has been calculated by taking the per-
centage diﬀerence between the ﬁrst futures contract (which is close to the
320 Jeffrey A. FrankelFig. 7C.1 A, Risk in top twelve oil exporters, monthly, weighted by 2003–2004 oil




Cspot rate) and the third futures contract (s   i – f ), adjusting for the three-
month Treasury rate over the two-month period between the contracts (the
maturity is not matched perfectly). There is quite a high correlation be-
tween this spread and movements in U.S. oil inventories:
Regression results
The relationship between weekly oil inventories and real interest rates is
estimated controlling for the three regressors described in the preceding.
When included individually, the spot-futures price spreadis signiﬁcant with
the expected sign (when the spot price rises relative to the futures price, oil
inventories fall). The twelve-week change in oil exporter risk is also signif-
icant with the expected sign (a negative change in the risk rating leads to an
increase in oil inventories). However, industrial production is not signiﬁ-
cant. The real interest rate coeﬃcient is negative in all these regressions but
is not signiﬁcant.
When all the regressors are included simultaneously (either in levels orin
changes), the spot-futures spread and risk are both signiﬁcant with the ex-
pected sign. The real rate coeﬃcient is negative and signiﬁcant. When
lagged inventories are added, the real rate coeﬃcient is no longer signiﬁ-
cant. When the spot-futures spread is assumed to be endogenous and in-
dustrial production (IP) and risk are used as instruments, the real rate
coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant (see table 7C.1).
The results are reasonably similar when the data are detrended by in-
cluding quadratic terms in each regression or through a ﬁrst-stage regres-
sion of each non-stationary regressor on a quadratic trend, with the residu-
als used in the second-stage regression where inventories is the regressand.
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Table 7C.1 Relationship between inventories and interest rates (weekly data; 1,114–1,190
observations depending on data availability)
Real Spot- Inventories
rate futures IP  IP Risk  risk (t – 1)
A. Nonstationary variables detrended by including quadratic terms in each regression
Real rate only –0.064
0.097




12 week  IP –0.014 –0.178
0.103 0.136
Oil exporter risk –0.095 0.000
0.103 0.001
12 week  oil exporter risk –0.192 –0.009**
0.100 0.001
Spot-futures, IP, risk –0.394** –0.821** 0.397** –0.002**
0.089 0.041 0.062 0.001
Spot-futures, IP, risk and –0.056 –0.079** 0.052** 0.000 0.931**
lagged inventories 0.032 0.013 0.020 0.000 0.009
Spot-futures,  IP,  risk –0.211** –0.727** 0.131 –0.005**
0.085 0.040 0.126 0.001
Spot-futures,  IP,  risk and  –0.017 –0.071** 0.009 0.000 0.937**
lagged inventories 0.032 0.012 0.045 0.000 0.009
Instrumental variables
Spot-futures; instruments:  –0.068 0.343
IP and risk 0.124 0.178
Spot-futures; instruments:  –0.159 –1.313**
 IP and  risk 0.102 0.212
B. Inventories, IP, and oil exporter risk detrended using ﬁrst stage regressions with quadratic trends
Real rate only –0.031
0.065




12 week  IP 0.043 –0.200
0.070 0.133
Oil exporter risk –0.154** 0.000
0.076 0.001
12 week  oil exporter risk –0.226** –0.009**
0.077 0.001
Spot-futures, IP, risk –0.131** –0.806* 0.304** –0.002**
0.067 0.042 0.062 0.001
Spot-futures, IP, risk and  –0.027 –0.076** 0.044** 0.000 0.933**
lagged inventories 0.023 0.013 0.019 0.000 0.009
Spot-futures,  IP,  risk –0.066 –0.723** 0.089 –0.005**
(continued)Appendix D
Relationship between Agricultural Inventories and 
Real Interest Rates, using Detrended Inventories
Annual inventories data were obtained from the U.S. Department of
Agriculture for twelve agricultural commodities. For comparative pur-
poses, we also include results using a series for petroleum inventories from
the Energy Department. To make the results easier to compare across com-
modities, we logged the inventories series, so the coeﬃcients are semielas-
ticities. Quarterly inventories data are available for some commodities, but
the seasonal patterns are extremely strong, so we converted all the com-
modities to a common annual frequency.
We estimated ﬁve regressions to explore this relationship for each com-
modity:
• In regression 1, there is no detrending.
• In regressions 2 and 3, linear ( t) or quadratic trends ( t  t2) are in-
cluded as extra regressors.
• Regressions 4 and 5 use a two-step procedure, ﬁrst detrending the in-
ventories series and then estimating the relationship.
The data suggest no systematic negative relationship between real inter-
est rates and agricultural inventories. The diﬀerent speciﬁcations do not
appear to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the results. The relationship has also
been estimated for the ﬁxed eﬀects panel of the nine commodities with data
available from 1950 to 2004. This sample is broken in 1982 to test for any
eﬀect from the change in monetary policy regime. The results suggest there
is a spurious positive relationship between interest rates and inventories.
The results for agricultural inventories are not to be taken too seriously as
we were unable to control for risk or other important variables.
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0.065 0.041 0.127 0.001
Spot-futures,  IP,  risk and  –0.003 –0.070** 0.006 0.000 0.937**
lagged inventories 0.024 0.012 0.044 0.000 0.009
Instrumental variables
Spot-futures; instruments:  –0.145 0.282
IP and risk 0.086 0.179
Spot-futures; instruments:  0.076 –1.368**
 IP and  risk 0.072 0.231
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
Table 7C.1 (continued)
Real Spot- Inventories
rate futures IP  IP Risk  risk (t – 1)References
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Table 7D.1 Relationship between agricultural inventories and interest rates (annual data)
Log Log Linear Quadratic
inventories inventories Detrended detrended
Log with linear with quadratic Log log
inventories trend trend inventories inventories
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
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(0.004) 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.004
Cattle (1950–2005) 0.007 0.006 –0.008 0.006 –0.007
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Comment Lars E.O. Svensson
This chapter makes two main points. The ﬁrst point is empirical: com-
modity prices are decreasing in the real interest rate. The second point is a
recommendation about monetary policy: central banks should stabilize
the domestic price of exports, and such a policy is better than Consumer
Price Index (CPI) inﬂation targeting.
I have no problems with the ﬁrst point. Frankel provides considerable
empirical evidence to support his conclusion. It also makes theoretical
sense that commodity prices may be negatively correlated with real inter-
est rates. Commodity prices can, to a large extent, be seen as asset prices.
Asset prices are discounted present values of expected future returns. A
rise in the real interest rate reduces the discount factors and thereby the
present value of any given expected future returns. Hence, unless increases
in real interest rates are systematically correlated with increases in ex-
pected returns or reductions in risk premiums, the negative eﬀect of the
real interest rate on the present value should dominate.
I have serious problems with the second point. Counter to what Frankel
argues, stabilizing the price of exports seems to me to be much inferior to
inﬂation targeting. For an oil exporter such as Norway facing the recent
doubling in the international oil price, the policy would imply a drastic de-
ﬂation of the CPI by approximately 50 percent. Such a policy would be
truly disastrous.
Regarding the ﬁrst point, should we expect commodity prices to be de-
creasing in the real interest rate or not? Let us consider a storable com-
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reau of Economic Research.modity in period t that will be used up in period t   1. Consider its pricing
in period t under the simplest possible circumstances and risk neutrality.
Then the price in period t, pt, would be given by
pt   ,
where pt 1|tis the price expected in period tthat the commodity can be sold
for in period t   1, ct   1|t is the expected storage cost between period t and
period t l to be paid in period t 1, and rtis the real interest rate between
period t and period t   1. If pt   1|t and ct   1|t are given, we see that pt is de-
creasing in rt. We can make this case more realistic and complex by intro-
ducing production of the commodity in each period at increasing marginal
cost and use of the commodity in each period at decreasing marginal ben-
eﬁt. As long as marginal cost and marginal beneﬁt are relatively indepen-
dent of the real interest rate, we would still expect commodity prices to be
negatively correlated with the real interest rate.
Of course, in a more realistic and complex model, commodity prices and
real interest rates are endogenous variables that are simultaneously deter-
mined by the structure of the economy, the economic policies conducted,
and the nature of the exogenous shocks in the economy. In particular, the
correlation between commodity prices depends on the nature of the shocks
that hit the economy and how these aﬀect the variables on the right side of
the preceding asset-price equation. Consider the relation between com-
modity prices and shocks to expected potential growth. From a simple
Euler condition for optimal consumption choice, we get the following re-
lation between the neutral (Wicksellian real) interest rate, rt
∗, the rate of
time preference,  , and expected potential output growth, gt   1|t: 
rt
∗     gt   1|t,
where   is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Here, potential out-
put is the hypothetical ﬂexprice level of output in an economy with sticky
prices, and the neutral interest rate is the corresponding hypothetical ﬂex-
price real interest rate. Furthermore, monetary policy can be seen as de-
termining the real interest rate gap, the gap between the real interest rate
and the neutral interest rate, rt – rt
∗. In this setting, treat potential output
growth as an exogenous stochastic process, and suppose that expected po-
tential output growth gt   1|t increases. Suppose that monetary policy main-
tains a relatively stable real interest-rate gap. Then, both rt
∗ and rt increase.
Furthermore, the increase in potential output growth might increase pt 1|t,
due to increasing demand for commodity use. In this case, both the nu-
merator and denominator in the preceding expression for the current com-
modity price increase, so it is no longer obvious that, for this kind of shock,




 ct   1|t   pt   1|t   
1   rt
328 Jeffrey A. FrankelThus, Frankel’s empirical results can be interpreted as stating that the di-
rect negative eﬀect of the real interest rate on commodity prices dominates
in most cases. This is not an obvious result, but it is arguably also not that
surprising.
The second main point is the shocking suggestion (to me, at least) that
pegging the export price index (PEPI) would be a better monetary policy
than the (core or headline) CPI inﬂation targeting currently pursued in
many countries. The reasons for this suggestion are not very well devel-
oped. Frankel states that PEPI has the property that an adverse terms-of-
trade movement would be associated with a currency depreciation. He
seems to take for granted that such a property is desirable. Frankel also
states that current CPI inﬂation targeting has the property that an adverse
terms-of-trade movement is associated with a currency appreciation, which
consequently is considered undesirable. It would have been good to have a
simple model where these properties of PEPI and CPI inﬂation targeting
and their desirability could be demonstrated.
Is it true that PEPI has the property that an adverse terms-of-trade eﬀect
is associated with a currency depreciation? First, consider a terms-of-trade
deterioration for a small open economy caused by a fall in the world price
(the foreign-currency price) of exports. At an unchanged exchange rate, the
domestic-currency price of exports would fall. Keeping the domestic-
currency price of exports stable, as PEPI implies, would, hence, indeed re-
quire a currency depreciation. Second, consider a terms-of-trade deterio-
ration caused by a rise in the world price of imports at an unchanged world
price of exports. At an unchanged exchange rate, the domestic-currency
price of exports would remain the same. Hence, in this case, PEPI requires
a constant exchange rate and no currency depreciation. Third, consider a
terms-of-trade deterioration associated with a rise in the world prices of
both exports and imports (that is, with a larger rise in the price of imports
than in the price of exports). At an unchanged exchange rate, the domestic
price of exports would rise. Hence, in this case, PEPI requires an appreci-
ation of the home currency. Thus, it is not always the case that PEPI implies
that an adverse terms-of-trade eﬀect is associated with a currency depreci-
ation.
The optimal policy for the exchange rate in the face of a terms-of-trade
deterioration is not obvious and requires a more elaborate model and anal-
ysis than there is room for here. Because that step is crucial for Frankel’s
argument, there should arguably be room for such a model and analysis in
his chapter.
Frankel does not provide any convincing argument that inﬂation target-
ing is problematic. To be more speciﬁc, consider ﬂexible (core) CPI inﬂation
targeting, which is practiced in many countries. This involves stabilizing
both the inﬂation gap between inﬂation and an inﬂation target and the out-
put gap between output and potential output. It seems to work ﬁne in both
The Effect of Monetary Policy on Real Commodity Prices 329advanced and emerging-market countries. That it works ﬁne in advanced
countries is well known. What is somewhat new is that it seems to work so
well in many emerging-market countries. The International Monetary
Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook of September 2005 notes that inﬂa-
tion targeting has worked ﬁne in a number of emerging-market countries.
No country that has adopted inﬂation targeting has abandoned it, and no
country has even expressed any regrets. In particular, inﬂation targeting
seems to work ﬁne even without a number of so-called preconditions, such
as good institutions, well-developed ﬁnancial markets, responsible ﬁscal
policies, and so forth.
Frankel’s PEPI may be interpreted as inﬂation targeting with the CPI
price index being replaced by the export price index. But what price index
should inﬂation targeting ideally refer to? Theoretical work by Kosuke
Aoki, Pierpaolo Benigno, and others has emphasized that, from a welfare
point of view, monetary policy should stabilize sticky prices rather than
ﬂexible prices. This minimizes the distortion caused by the existence of
sticky prices and brings the economy closer to a ﬂexprice equilibrium.
These results can be interpreted as favoring a core CPI or domestic inﬂa-
tion targeting. In particular, these results suggest that central banks should
not try to stabilize ﬂexible commodity prices, in direct contradiction to
PEPI. Other often-mentioned reasons for choosing a CPI-related index is
that the CPI is the index best known by the general public, that stabilizing
it would simplify decisions for the average consumer, that it is frequently
published, and that it is usually not revised. Indeed, all inﬂation targeting
central banks have chosen the CPI or a core CPI.
The PEPI would imply riding a tiger. Consider Norway, a major oil ex-
porter. The oil price has approximately doubled in a few years. This is a
huge terms-of-trade improvement for Norway. Frankel would prefer that
Norges Bank, the central bank of Norway, stabilizes the domestic price of
oil. In order to keep the domestic-currency price of oil from rising, Norges
Bank would have had to double the value of the Norwegian krone during
this time, that is, to have had to induce a 100 percent appreciation of the
krone. This would be an extremely contractionary policy. Put diﬀerently,
under the simpliﬁed assumption that the relative price of oil to consumer
goods has doubled, achieving this new relative price in Norway at an un-
changed domestic-currency price of oil requires that other consumer prices
are reduced by 50 percent. Thus, Frankel is suggesting that it would have
been better for Norway and the Norwegians if Norges Bank had induced
such a huge deﬂation.
How should the central bank respond to oil-price changes (or any terms-
of-trade changes)? This follows from the principles of Good Monetary Pol-
icy (Svensson 2002). Indeed, for monetary policy, oil-price changes are not
very special: they are just another shock (although potentially large and
persistent). Good Monetary Policy is ﬂexible inﬂation targeting, which can
330 Jeffrey A. Frankelmore narrowly be speciﬁed as aiming at both stabilizing inﬂation around
an inﬂation target and stabilizing the output gap around zero. Further-
more, the lags between monetary policy actions on one hand and the
eﬀects on inﬂation and output on the other hand imply that central banks
should do “forecast targeting.” That is, they should look at forecasts of in-
ﬂation and set the interest-rate path (or plan) such that forecasts of inﬂa-
tion and the output gap “look good.” Here, look good means that the in-
ﬂation forecast (path) approaches the inﬂation target and the output gap
forecast (path) approaches zero. In other words, look good means a rea-
sonable compromise between stabilizing inﬂation and stabilizing the out-
put gap. These principles for Good Monetary Policy are very simple to
state. The practice of achieving them can be quite diﬃcult, though.
Implementing inﬂation targeting requires interpreting and understand-
ing the nature of the disturbances hitting the economy. Terms-of-trade
movements are movements in the relative price between exports and im-
ports. Relative-price movements have both income and substitution eﬀects
on aggregate demand that need to be sorted out. Terms-of-trade move-
ments can also be accompanied by movements in world inﬂation or the
world price level. Such movements are movements in absolute prices, the
eﬀects of which also need to be sorted out. A standard problem for inﬂa-
tion targeting central banks is to assess whether incoming shocks are tem-
porary or persistent, for instance, whether a particular shock corresponds
to a one-time price-level shift or a persistent inﬂation-level shift. Making
such assessments is a standard part of the analysis by inﬂation targeting
central banks.
These principles and analysis are routinely applied by central banks to
oil-price changes (Svensson 2005). Oil-price changes shift inﬂation and
output-gap forecasts at a given interest rate path (they have both income
and substitution eﬀects and lead to shifts in the forecasted inﬂation, out-
put, and potential-output paths). After such shifts, these forecasts may no
longer look good. Then central banks adjust the interest-rate path, so the
inﬂation and output-gap forecasts look good again.
What happens to the exchange rate during these shifts? That depends,
since the impact of oil-price changes is quite complex. A short answer is
whatever is consistent with the optimal inﬂation, output-gap, and interest-
rate forecasts. In some cases, a depreciation is called for, in other cases, an
appreciation. Importantly, under inﬂation targeting, the exchange rate is
not a target variable, and there is no target exchange rate level.
In each Monetary Policy Report(available at http://www.norges-bank.no),
Norges Bank routinely analyzes these issues and presents its conclusion
and decision in the form of informative graphs of an optimal instrument
rate, inﬂation, output-gap, and exchange rate forecast, with fan charts em-
phasizing the unavoidable uncertainty of the forecasts. This inﬂation and
output-gap forecast represents the bank’s best compromise between stabi-
The Effect of Monetary Policy on Real Commodity Prices 331lizing the inﬂation gap and the output gap. The bank presents a baseline
scenario but also alternative scenarios with alternative assumptions about
exogenous disturbances and the transmission mechanism. This is an excel-
lent example of current best-practice inﬂation targeting.
My point with this reference to routine elements of the Monetary Policy
Report of Norges Bank is that there is absolutely no reason to abandon
ﬂexible inﬂation targeting for PEPI. Flexible inﬂation targeting is superior
in handling all kinds of disturbances. The PEPI would be a disaster.
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Discussion Summary
Jeﬀrey A. Frankel responded to Lars E.O. Svensson that there is limited
popular understanding of the core Consumer Price Index (CPI) which
makes this a less suitable price index for inﬂation targeting than Svensson
suggested. Frankel also argued that even those who are unwilling to peg an
export price index should place some extra weight on export prices in
deﬁning the price index that is to be targeted.
William C. Dudleyasked why a commodity price change should demand
a monetary policy response if it was merely a relative price change. Frankel
responded that he thought of commodity price changes as informative
about the natural rate of interest, just as previous discussion had suggested
that other asset prices were a useful input in estimating the natural rate.
Donald L. Kohn said that a jump in commodity prices would tell policy-
makers that the natural interest rate had declined, but that commodity
prices would then tend to drift down. It was hard to know how central
banks could distinguish initial jumps from subsequent movement.
Martin Schneider pointed out that the eﬀects of interest rates seemed
strongest on perishable goods. Frankel agreed that this was surprising.
Andrew Levin said that, judging from the graphs, the results from ﬁfty
years of data were being driven by three outlier years. On the topic of in-
terest rates driving commodity prices, he was skeptical in the case of a com-
modity such as hogs: he wondered whether the relationship was being
332 Jeffrey A. Frankeldriven not by intertemporal optimization, but rather by some kind of ag-
gregate demand shift. Frankel argued that farmers should satisfy an in-
tertemporal optimization condition. Simon Gilchrist observed that com-
modities such as soybeans require large amounts of land; he suggested that
this might explain why interest rates were important. Regarding pegging
export prices, Levin said that the optimal policy regime should vary from
country to country. In the case of Ghana, for example, with a centralized
market for cocoa, it was most important to ensure that the currency is
stable against the U.S. dollar.
Tommaso Monacelli said that for terms of trade to enter the loss func-
tion, all that was required was to have a non-Cobb-Douglas utility func-
tion.
Lars E.O. Svensson said that a country with volatile terms of trade may
wish to consider other strategies for insuring against the welfare eﬀects of
changes in the terms of trade. Norway, for example, saves part of its wind-
fall gain from rising oil prices in a national fund invested in global assets.
Other countries should consider emulating this approach.
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